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international financial institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country
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The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings
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the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee)
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from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and contributions from
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Abstract
This study seeks to explain the origin, process, and prospects of East Asia’s “counter-
weight” strategy in the arena of international finance, and its significant implications
for global financial governance. Overall, this study addresses three key questions: (i) What
motivated East Asia’s counterweight strategy and the emergence of Asian financial
arrangements such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and the Asian Bond Fund Initiative
(ABFI)? (ii) What are the nature and purpose of the CMI and the ABFI? (iii) What
would determine the future trajectory of the Asian financial cooperation and East Asia’s
counterweight strategy? The central argument of the present study is that East Asian
countries search for counterweight strategies that will enable them to avoid over-
dependence and loss of autonomy by developing regional alternatives even as they
maintain collaborative relations with the G-7-centred global financial institutions
(e.g. the IMF). Policy makers in East Asia are thus hedging their economic bets about
the uncertain prospects of both the creation of regional institutions and the reform of
global institutions. My findings also suggest that four key factors, such as regional
economic conditions, geopolitical rivalry, the IMF reforms, and the United States and
EU reactions would possibly shape the future development of East Asia’s counterweight
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International monetary order is changing, and
East Asia is an important cause. The structure of
economic power and parameters of interactions that
have characterized the Group of Seven (G-7)-domi-
nated global financial governance over the last half
century are being fundamentally affected by, among
other factors, East Asia’s growing economic and fi-
nancial power, rising political influence, and, more
importantly, increasing regional financial coopera-
tion. In recent years, clear progress has been made
in East Asia’s collective efforts to create new regional
financial cooperative mechanisms. The main forum
for such efforts became one comprised exclusively
of East Asian countries, notably excluding the United
States. The member countries of the Association for
Southeast Asian Nations, and China, Japan and the
Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3) have been attempt-
ing to transform the bilateral swap arrangements
under the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) into a multi-
lateral arrangement. The multilateralization of the
CMI is perceived by many Asia watchers as a signifi-
cant step towards the creation of an Asian Monetary
Fund (AMF), an Asian version of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). East Asian countries also
have sought to develop a vibrant regional bond mar-
ket. The emergence of Asia’s own regional bond
market driven by the Asian Bond Fund (and Mar-
ket) Initiative would possibly complement and con-
strain the United States and Europe-centred global
capital markets. Moreover, even the creation of a
single Asian currency is now more vigorously stud-
ied by East Asian governments. Such dramatic
changes have been caused by regional actors’ low-
key, accommodating, and prudent approaches to re-
gional financial cooperation. East Asian countries
search for “counterweight” strategies that will al-
low them to avoid overdependence even as they
maintain cooperative relations with the G-7-centred
global financial institutions (e.g. the IMF).1 East
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Asian countries do not intend to directly challenge
the United States and Europe, given the overwhelm-
ing significance of cooperation with the two economic
powers to achieve common goals. When East Asia’s
policy preference diverges significantly from the
United States and Europe, however, East Asian coun-
tries want to bolster their policy position and bargain-
ing power vis-à-vis the non-Asian economic powers
by developing and using regional alternatives. This
pattern of East Asia’s counterweight strategy is tak-
ing form at the very time that the international finan-
cial architecture is profoundly evolving. G-7-centred
decision-making characterized the post-World War II
international financial architecture, namely, the Bretton
Woods system. G-7 members directly or through the
IMF made most of the decisions on global financial
governance, with the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS), the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), and the World
Bank playing supporting roles (Helleiner, 1994;
Pauly, 1997; and Strange, 1998). The traditional role
of this architecture is now being called into ques-
tion. An increasing number of developing countries
have questioned the legitimacy and effectiveness of
the relatively exclusive decision-making structure
of global financial governance particularly after the
1997–98 Asian financial crisis. In the context of these
complex dynamics, counterweight strategy is a
notable pattern of East Asia’s interaction with the
rest of the world in international finance. What mo-
tivated the emergence of Asian financial arrange-
ments such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and
the Asian Bond Fund Initiative (ABFI)? What are
the nature and purpose of the CMI and the ABFI?
What would determine the future trajectory of the
Asian financial cooperation and East Asia’s coun-
terweight strategy?
II. Why East Asia counterweights
With their rapid economic ascent, East Asian
countries became increasingly aware that their indi-
vidual and collective positions within the global
economy are not fairly reflected in existing interna-
tional institutions. For instance, East Asia’s quota
share and corresponding voting power in the IMF
do not represent its relative importance in the world
economy. As of the early 2000s, the ASEAN, and
China, Japan and the Republic of Korea have about
13 per cent of the total quota but this is much less
than its shares of GDP (24 per cent), PPP-based GDP
(25 per cent), trade (16 per cent), reserves (28 per
cent) and population (33 per cent) (Rapkin and
Strand, 2003). The 1997–98 Asian financial crisis
brought to the fore East Asia’s relative positions vis-
à-vis the Western countries in the IMF, which deeply
intervened the economic policymaking of the region’s
crisis-hit countries. From the East Asian perspectives,
their ability to influence the IMF conditionality and
resist the IMF policies perceived as counterproduc-
tive, is significantly constrained by their limited
quota shares and voting power in the IMF.
The dissatisfaction with the IMF’s performance
in the Asian financial crisis (Higgott, 1998; and Wade
and Veneroso, 1998) and the discontent with the un-
der-representation of East Asia in the G-7-centred
international financial institutions left two primary
policy options with East Asian countries: global and
regional ones. They can seek substantial reforms of
the global institutions or (and) pursue the creation
of regional alternative institutions. However, East
Asian countries confront a deep uncertainty about
the evolution of both global and regional financial
institutions. At the global level, the prospects for
serious reforms in the G-7-centred global financial
institutions have been still remote in the eyes of many
Asian policy makers. Although the G-7 had finally
begun to engage more expansively in dialogue with
the rest of the world through the Financial Stability
Forum (FSF) and the Group of 20 (G-20) following
the Asian financial crisis, such adjustments have not
met the expectation of East Asian countries (Sohn,
2005). In the views of many Asian developing coun-
tries, the FSF featured heavy G-7 representation; the
new FSF excluded key emerging Asian economies
such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of
Korea and Thailand. Although the G-20 included
three non-G-7-Asian countries (China, Indonesia
and the Republic of Korea), unlike the G-7, the G-20
remained a non decision-making body. The involve-
ment of several Asian countries therefore would
make little difference in the actual decision-making
process of global financial governance. Moreover,
the FSF and the G-20 tended to emphasize the do-
mestic aspects of the reforms (in developing
countries in particular), as opposed to the interna-
tional aspects of the reforms, such as hedge funds,
transnational capital flows, and offshore financial
centres, which were widely suspected of complicity
in the speculative frenzy around the Asian crisis. The
international dimensions of the reforms might entail
painful adjustment for the G-7 as well as non-G-73 East Asia’s Counterweight Strategy: Asian Financial Cooperation and Evolving International Monetary Order
countries. The perceived lacklustre interest of the
new global financial institutions in the international
aspects of the reforms also contributed to reinforcing
East Asia’s discontent and scepticism that fundamen-
tal changes to the G-7-centred global financial
institutions are out of reach.
Meanwhile, at the regional level, scepticism
about the feasibility and desirability of Asia’s efforts
to create more cohesive arrangements or institutions
have prevailed both within and outside of the region.2
A series of potential political and economic hurdles
seemed to shadow the future of Asian financial co-
operation (this point will be discussed later in more
detail). The ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in
changing global institutions and creating regional
institutions has become a central driver of current
East Asia policy. Against this background, East Asian
countries have pursued the risk-averse counterweight
strategy, which intends to create new regional finan-
cial arrangements and thereby avoid overdependence
while sustaining collaborative relations with the
G-7-dominated global financial institutions.
III. How East Asia counterweights
The early twenty first century witnesses the
increased efforts of East Asian governments to pro-
mote financial cooperation at the regional level. Such
collective actions aim to both reduce the region’s
vulnerabilities to a future financial crisis and improve
the allocation of savings. A series of initiatives have
been launched to increase regional self-sufficiency,
ranging from information sharing to financial swap
arrangements and regional bond market. Among the
new initiatives are the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)
and the Asian Bond Fund Initiative (ABFI), which
illustrate East Asia’s new behaviour and linkage with
global financial governance in the early 2000s.
A. The Chiang Mai Initiative
The CMI is designed to provide liquidity sup-
port for member countries that experience short-run
balance-of-payment deficits, with the purpose of
preventing an extreme crisis or systemic failure in a
country and subsequent regional contagion, such as
the kind that occurred in the 1997–98 Asian financial
crisis. During the first phase of the CMI, 16 bilateral
currency swap arrangements have been negotiated
and concluded among ASEAN+3 countries. Each
agreement enables parties to borrow the equivalent
of $1–3 billion in foreign exchange reserves from
partners.
The initial amounts ($36.5 billion) involved
under the CMI appeared relatively small and inad-
equate for single-handedly preventing speculative
attacks. Such scepticism is understandable, given the
huge amounts of foreign exchange reserves held by
ASEAN+3 countries as a whole (which amount to
$1.8 trillion), as well as, the emergency assistance
required by the crisis-hit countries in the 1997 cri-
sis, since Thailand alone requested $17.2 billion.
With such small amounts involved, one might ex-
pect that assistance via the CMI would have to be
supplemented by the IMF and/or additional pack-
ages of aid negotiated at the time of crisis.
Recognizing such a weakness, in May 2005,
East Asian countries decided to double the amount
of emergency funds to be provided to crisis-hit na-
tions to some $80 billion (the second stage of the
CMI) while noting exact size could be decided by
bilateral negotiations. As of May 2006, the size of
the CMI amounted to $75 billion. The recent ongo-
ing efforts to increase the size of the CMI show a
clear consensus shared by East Asian countries that
the dependence on an IMF or the United States-de-
termined solution to financial crisis in the region is
insufficient; East Asia pursues a regional option, as
well as, the existing global one, to build defences
against future speculative attack.
Another notable feature of the initial CMI is
its linkage with the IMF. The initial CMI required
its member countries drawing more than 10 per
cent from the funds in the CMI to accept an IMF
conditionality. This means that East Asia’s pre-
emptive measure to reduce exchange rate volatility
prior to a full-fledged crisis is hindered. In general,
IMF programmes are not negotiated until crisis has
already occurred. Ten per cent of the swap lines are
too small to prevent a significant attack. Some par-
ticipating countries, particularly Malaysia, opposed
the linkage of the CMI with IMF conditionality.
Meanwhile, other members such as China and Japan
argued for the importance of forging a cooperative
relationship with the IMF at an early stage of the
CMI development to make it more credible. After
all, East Asian countries agreed to accept the link-4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 44
age of the CMI to the IMF as a temporary arrange-
ment until a formal surveillance mechanism is put
in place. This compromise can be explained by two
factors. First, the IMF possesses better institutional-
ized surveillance mechanisms that the ASEAN+3
lacks. The IMF conducts annual review of member
country economies via Article 4 consultations, as
well as, assessments of financial sector vulnerability
through the Financial Sector Assessment Programme
(FSAP). For some East Asian countries, it would be
ineffective and inappropriate to lend funds to coun-
tries whose operations were not under this type of
regular surveillance. Linking the CMI to the IMF
can ensure that funds lent had a better chance of being
repaid, even if ASEAN+3 remained critical of IMF
conditionality per se (Amyx, 2004: 6–7). In addi-
tion to the “efficiency (or functional)” consideration,
the logic of interstate “power” structure helped East
Asian countries to take an accommodating and pru-
dent approach to the CMI. Many of East Asian
countries worried that the United States and Euro-
pean Union (EU) would oppose a new Asian
financial framework which lacks any IMF linkage
as in the case of the aborted Asian Monetary Fund
plan in 1997. Given the limited, albeit growing, po-
litical power of East Asian grouping vis-à-vis the
United States and EU, East Asian countries needed
to water down the independent nature of the CMI at
the initial stage of regional financial integration.
At the meeting of the ASEAN+3 Finance Min-
isters in May 2001 in Honolulu, member countries
agreed to review the issues of the IMF linkage with
the CMI after three years had passed, leaving room
for possible revision of the linkage requirement. In
May 2005, the finance ministers of the East Asian
governments agreed to double the size of the emer-
gency funds that could be withdrawn without IMF
conditionality from 10 per cent to 20 per cent. This
revision represents the incremental approach taken
by East Asian countries in loosening their adherence
to the IMF conditionality. Whether or not the CMI
eliminates their IMF linkage in the near future, such
a regional liquidity fund clearly intends to comple-
ment the role of the IMF in crisis management in
the long term. At the moment, the IMF linkage made
the CMI look more inclusive (as opposed to exclu-
sive), thereby help to deflect suspicions and criticism
from non-Asian economic powers. In this sense, the
CMI reflects East Asia’s strategic behaviour to coun-
ter the risk of its overdependence on the IMF even
as they maintain collaborative relations with the IMF
and other G-7-centred global financial institutions.
More progress has been made in boosting the
CMI recently. The ASEAN+3 countries have been
increasingly seeking to transform the CMI into a sin-
gle multilateral framework since 2005. To this end,
collective decision-making procedure for the CMI
activation was adopted. All swap providing coun-
tries can simultaneously and promptly provide
liquidity support to any parties involved in bilateral
swap arrangements at times of emergency. In May
2006, East Asian countries also agreed to set up a
“new task force” to further study various possible op-
tions towards CMI multilateralization (or Post-CMI).
Moreover, one can find that more concrete steps
are being taken by East Asia towards the creation of
an independent regional surveillance mechanism,
which is crucial for the rise of the CMI with a
regionally tailored conditionality that would fairly
reflect Asian circumstances. For example, in May
2006 the ASEAN+3 nations declared to launch the
Group of Experts (GOE) and the Technical Work-
ing Group on Economic and Financial Monitoring
(ETWG) to explore the ways for further strengthen-
ing surveillance capacity in East Asia. The GOE,
composed of several regional professional experts,
would serve as an independent economic assessment
vehicle for this region. The ETWG would play an
important role in developing and spreading the Early
Warning System to facilitate early detection of ir-
regularities. These new efforts would significantly
contribute to enhancing East Asia’s surveillance ca-
pacity, thus increasing the effectiveness of the CMI.
B. Asian Bond Fund Initiative
Asian Bond Fund Initiative (ABFI) added to
the momentum of Asian financial cooperation. The
ABFI, along with the CMI, promised prospects that
would contribute to changing the international fi-
nancial landscape. In the Executives’ Meeting of East
Asia Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) in June 2003,
the region’s central bankers association – which in-
cludes representatives from Australia, China, Hong
Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Sin-
gapore and Thailand – announced the creation of
the Asian Bond Fund with an initial size of about
$1 billion. This first stage of the ABFI invested in a
basket of dollar denominated bonds issued by Asian
sovereign and quasi-sovereign issuers in EMEAP5 East Asia’s Counterweight Strategy: Asian Financial Cooperation and Evolving International Monetary Order
economies. Building on the success of ABF1, the
EMEAP launched the second stage of the Asian Bond
Fund (ABF2) in July 2005. The ABF2 invested in
local-currency bonds issued by sovereign and quasi-
sovereign issuers in the eight EMEAP markets.
EMEAP members have invested a total of $2 billion
of seed money in ABF2, which comprises nine com-
ponent funds: a Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF)
and eight single-market funds.
The rationale for broadening and deepening
regional bond markets can be twofold. First, the es-
tablishment of the ABFI ultimately aims to bring
back the huge amount of Asian foreign reserves that
were traditionally saved in Europe or in the United
States to be used in bond investments throughout
Asia. In the past decades, much of Asian savings
were channelled into international bond markets in
the United States or Europe due in part to the under-
development of Asian regional bond market. A
growing number of Asian policy makers were be-
coming unhappy about the fact that the wealth of
East Asia has been used (in the form of the United
States treasury bond) to finance the swelling of the
United States current account deficit, rather than to
create greater prosperity for the region.3 Such con-
cerns urged Asian governments to accelerate plans
for a regional Asian bond market as a counterweight
to bond markets in the west.
Second, the ABFI intends to shield the region
from the external vulnerabilities by building more
robust and diversified local capital markets. The
dominant view of those supporting the Asian bond
market expansion is that the Asian financial crisis
would have been less severe if local bond markets
had been more developed and financial intermedia-
tion in the crisis-affected countries had not been so
heavily concentrated on banks (Lejot et al., 2003).
While the ABFI has the potential to challenge
the dominance of the United States and EU in the
global capital markets, the recent emphasis that many
Asian leaders have placed on the Asian-Bond-
Eurobond linkage and the creation of a Euro Bond
Market in Asia helped to mobilize EU support for
the idea of an Asian Bond Market. In line with Asian-
European financial cooperation, for example, eleven
Central Bank governors from the Executives’ Meet-
ing of East Asia-Pacific, the president of the European
Central Bank, and twelve governors from the Euro-
system National Central Banks held a joint high-level
seminar in Singapore in July 2004 to exchange views
on the issues of common interests and to consoli-
date relations between EMEAP and the Euro-system.
Overall, the ABFI creates another counter-
weight enabling East Asia to go beyond the IMF (or
the United States) support in finance for develop-
ment and crisis management. The ABFI would serve
as another means through which East Asian coun-
tries can push forward their agenda, but without
antagonizing G-7 and endangering their relationship
with the IMF.
IV. Challenges and prospects
There are some of the forces that might frus-
trate or facilitate Asian financial cooperation and
relevant East Asia’s counterweight strategy: regional
economic conditions, geopolitical rivalry, the IMF
reforms, and the United States and EU reactions.
First, in terms of structural economic conditions, East
Asia faces both favourable and unfavourable envi-
ronments. On the bright side of economic conditions,
intensifying financial globalization provided a com-
mon economic enemy, namely, financial contagion
effect, to East Asia. Following their bitter experience
of the Asian financial crisis, East Asian countries have
more clearly recognized the common goals of prevent-
ing a future financial crisis and ensuring economic
security in an increasingly interdependent global
economy. In the views of East Asian countries, uni-
lateral response would be no longer effective enough
to protect their own economies from future interna-
tional financial turmoil given the interdependent
nature of financial globalization; the unilateral strat-
egy of holding a very large stock of foreign exchange
reserves to deal with large but infrequent capital
flight is an extremely expensive strategy. Accord-
ingly, Asian policy makers came to realize that a
regional pooling of foreign exchange reserves might
be cost-effective means to pursue their common ends
of reducing the instability of trans-border capital
movements.
While such a functional need exists, however,
regional economic diversity might hamper regional
cooperation. The differences in economic size, de-
velopment stage, and domestic regulation can
possibly complicate Asia’s collective action in re-
gional financial cooperation.4 Apparently such
economic obstacles and challenges might slow the6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 44
pace of regional cooperation. It is, however, an over-
statement that such economic hurdles can determine
the direction of Asian financial cooperation. Re-
gional financial cooperation is foremost a political
process as in the case of European monetary union.
The political will of Asian policy makers would ul-
timately determine the final outcome of the regional
cooperation. Put it differently, economic conditions
alone do not point to any particular policy outcome,
either success or failure in the realm of Asian finan-
cial cooperation. Given the ambiguous effects of
regional economic conditions on the future trajectory
of Asian financial cooperation, East Asian countries
would continue to see regional multilateralism as a
viable supplement or alternative to global multi-
lateralism while simultaneously seeking to shape the
existing international institutions in their favour.
Such a counterweight strategy is more likely to re-
main intact for some years to come despite (and
because of) the regional economic conditions.
A second key factor that might significantly
affect Asia’s cooperative efforts is interstate politi-
cal dynamics. The potential rivalry between China and
Japan for regional hegemony, and political tensions
between Japan and its Northeast Asian neighbours
over history issues and disputed islets are good ex-
amples in point. These are significant political
challenges facing East Asia. Yet it is misreading to
characterize such geopolitical rivalry as insurmount-
able obstacles that are destined to frustrate Asian
financial cooperation. In recent years, regional fi-
nancial cooperation has been largely insulated from
diplomatic and political competitions among coun-
tries in the region. This situation can be dubbed as
“hot economics and cold politics”. Despite the frosty
political relations between Japan and its Northeast
Asian neighbours, the three economic powerhouses
of the region, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea,
have managed to keep intergovernmental financial
cooperation on track.5 For instance, Japan and the
Republic of Korea agreed on second $15 billion cur-
rency swap accord under the CMI in February 2006.6
Likewise, at the trilateral finance ministers’ meet-
ing on the sideline of the Asian Development Bank’s
annual conference in May 2006, the Northeast Asian
trio agreed to make more progress in regional finan-
cial cooperation including the feasibility study of
Asian currency unit, and reached a consensus on the
reform of the IMF.
On a related point, it should be also noted here
that it would be difficult to expect the rise of either
China-centred or Japan-centred regional monetary
hierarchy in the near or medium term. On the sur-
face, China and Japan, the two major economic
powers in the region, seem to enjoy sufficient eco-
nomic leverage to influence the Asian financial
cooperative initiatives. Yet in terms of issue-specific
soft power such as financial management skills and
know-how (as opposed to aggregate economic ca-
pacity), the two countries do not stand out as well
equipped to lead the regional financial cooperation,
in particular, the Asian Bond Fund Initiative. De-
spite China’s growing foreign currency reserves,
China has few appealing knowledge, ideology, and
vision for Asian financial cooperation. This signifi-
cantly decreases the chances of China becoming a
singular pole in Asian financial system in the near
future. While many Asian countries see that Japan
can make substantive contribution on the develop-
ment of Asian financial cooperation, Japan is not
well positioned to lead all dimensions of the infra-
structure building endeavour. For example, Japan
lacks its own credible ratings agencies, one of key
infrastructure for a well-functioning bond market.
The least likely scenario of the emergence of one-
country-dominant regional hierarchy in international
finance helps to reduce the suspicions of the region’s
small countries about the zero-sum consequence (he-
gemony gains most) of Asian financial cooperation.
There is also another incentive for small Asian coun-
tries to voice their support for financial multilateralism
in the region. Small Asian countries may value the pre-
dictability in the two regional powers’ rule-governed
behaviour in a multilateral setting, even though those
multilateral rules might favour the strong. Big states
cannot do just anything they want within multilateral
arrangements. They should often restrain themselves
and play by multilateral rules out of self-interest.
This can also contribute to little states’ support for
regional multilateralism. In short, like the region’s
economic conditions, Asia’s geopolitical dynamics
alone cannot direct the fate of regional financial co-
operation. From the geopolitical perspectives, it is
fair to say that it remains unknown whether the re-
gion’s political dynamics would serve as a blessing
or curse for Asian financial cooperation. Such un-
certainties would also contribute to making East
Asia’s counterweight strategy relevant and reason-
able at this point.
Third, the reactions from the United States and
Europe are also significant influences on the future
trajectory of Asian financial cooperation. Their re-
actions have been supportive or at least receptive.7 East Asia’s Counterweight Strategy: Asian Financial Cooperation and Evolving International Monetary Order
This is in contrast to their anxiety and opposition to
the 1997 Japanese proposal for the creation of the
AMF. Europe showed support for the establishment
of an Asian bond market at the Fifth meeting of the
ASEM Finance Ministers in July, 2003. The United
States also began to more explicitly voice its sup-
port for greater monetary integration in East Asia in
June 2006.7
The absence of external opposition to the cur-
rent Asian financial cooperative initiatives reflects
perceptions that the newly emerging Asian finan-
cial arrangements will neither eclipse the functions
of other multilateral institutions nor significantly
undermine the activities of other bond markets in
the near future. As discussed above, such percep-
tions are attributable to the CMI’s linkage with the
IMF and East Asia’s emphasis on the Asian Bond-
Eurobond linkage. This also suggests that East Asia’s
counterweight strategy has been so far effective: East
Asia has made considerable progress in establish-
ing regional supplements (or potential alternatives)
while not creating a major fissure in their relation-
ship with key actors outside the region. Such posi-
tive feedback is more likely to add to the momentum
of East Asia’s incremental and low-profile counter-
weight strategy in the foreseeable future.
Fourth, the outcome of the ongoing IMF reform
would considerably affect the future development
of the Asian financial cooperation and Asian coun-
terweight strategy. East Asian countries are now
becoming more active advocates of the IMF reform.
One of significant challenges for multilateralism is
to revise rules that accommodate changing power
disparity and accepted by others including both the
weak and the strong. Interstate power configuration
can often change faster than international institutions.
If multilateral institutions become only means for
the declining or reigning powers to use to influence
the rising powers, the rising powers would resist
multilateral rules, thus making multilateralism inef-
fective.8 In this respect, the IMF should take measures
to accommodate East Asia’s growing economic
power to make the IMF effective and legitimate. The
IMF began to signal its intention to change the vot-
ing quota of the IMF, reflecting changing distribution
of world economic power. However, it is still unclear
whether the IMF reform would result in substantive
changes or cosmetic changes. Some sceptics specu-
late that the G-7 try to close a deal on a minimal
change to the representation of the IMF. The con-
servative tendencies of status quo powers and the
bureaucratic inertia of existing international institu-
tions would considerably constrain the pace and
scope of the IMF reforms. Until and unless substan-
tial adjustments are made to fairly reflect East Asia’s
growing economic power in the IMF and other
Bretton Woods institutions, East Asian countries are
less likely to lose political motivation to seek an
Asian alternative through its counterweight strategy.
V. Next steps in Asia’s evolving
monetary order
Since the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, policy
makers in East Asia have made more substantial
progress in the regional initiatives, such as the CMI
and the ABFI than sceptics might initially anticipate.
The more eye-catching agreement in recent Asian
financial cooperation is about the idea of a regional
currency unit. In May 2006, East Asian governments
decided to study the idea of an Asian Currency Unit
(ACU), a first step on the long road to an Asian Euro.
According to Mr. Haruhiko Kuroda, President of the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), ACU is a theo-
retical currency unit made up of a basket of Asian
currencies that would not be traded and would serve
simply as an index of Asian exchange rates relative
to each other. Although Mr. Kuroda and other advo-
cates describe ACU in typically low-key manner out
of concerns about possible suspicion and opposition
from other regions, it has echoes of the European
Currency Unit (ECU) which led eventually to the Euro
(Rowley, 2006).
It remains an open question whether Asia’s
common currency is desirable on the economic
grounds and what the roadmap should be like when
the East Asian countries one day reach the conclu-
sion that it is both desirable and feasible.9 Yet one of
the significant implications of the idea of ACU is
that policy makers in East Asia are continuously
willing to work together for increasing financial co-
operation and keep their minds open to all new ideas,
be it an Asian currency or something more suitable
for Asia.
Moreover, the CMI, the ABFI, and ACU clearly
reflect the logic of East Asia’s counterweight strat-
egy. That is, to develop its own regional supplements
(or potential alternatives), thereby better positioning
regional actors in the evolution of the international8 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 44
monetary order without antagonizing key players
outside the region. The logic of this counterweight
strategy is understandable; it enables East Asia to
sustain its extensive and beneficial relations with the
G-7-centred institutions while addressing uncertainty
about evolving international monetary order. Policy
makers in East Asia are hedging their economic bets
about the uncertain prospects of both the creation of
regional institutions and the revision of global insti-
tutions.
It remains to be seen what the United States
and its G-7 allies may do in the face of East Asian
collective action on regional financial arrangements.
The United States seems to lack a clear strategy of
what Asian monetary order it desires. The United
States should not view East Asian-only arrangements
negatively just because it is not a member. Instead,
it needs to actively support Asian regional coopera-
tion to signal the United States interest in Asia and
promote positive norms of global financial govern-
ance. Such a strategy would generate the perception
that the United States is working on behalf of Asian
interests, thus boosting the legitimacy of the United
States presence and influence in the region. The
United States is already a member of many regional
economic organizations such as Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) and the Asian Development
Bank, and does not have to belong to every organi-
zation to exert influence. The key allies of the United
States even in the Asians-only groupings may be able
to voice the United States interests. The pragmatic
and receptive stance of the United States and its G-7
allies on East Asia’s moderate and prudent counter-
weight strategy would contribute to maintaining East
Asia’s cooperative behaviour in global financial
governance, and facilitating the peaceful evolution
of international monetary order in the 21st century.
Notes
1 On the concept of “counterweight strategy” with some
modifications, I benefit from Saori Katada’s work on
United States-Japan economic relations.
2 For the heated debates over the desirability and feasibil-
ity of the recent Asian financial cooperation, for exam-
ple, see Henning (2002), Park (2000) and Eichengreen
(2003).
3 For example, in his speech advocating substantial re-
gional bond market expansions, Hong Kong Monetary
Authority Chief Executive Joseph Yam argued that “the
cost of capital for enterprises in Asia would be lower, if
there was a deep and well-functioning corporate bond
market in the region to tap the considerable pool of sav-
ings, much of which now flows instead to industrial coun-
tries.” See Hong Kong Monetary Authority Chief Ex-
ecutive Joseph Yam (2006).
4 Another economic (and potentially political) challenge
concerns the issue of conditionality in loans from the
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). Who would determine the
conditions on borrowers when the CMI is transformed
into a full-fledged multilateral arrangement, independ-
ent of the IMF? Will there be a technical secretariat that
imposes conditions? Will decisions be made by weighted
voting in accord with the contributions of member coun-
tries or one-country-one-vote? These issues need to be
resolved before the CMI can substitute the IMF. I am
indebted to Ariel Buira on this point.
5 For recent trilateral cooperation among Japan, China and
the Republic of Korea, see Yoshimatsu (2005).
6 When Japan and the Republic of Korea agreed on a sec-
ond $15 billion currency swap accord under the CMI,
the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Han
Duck-soo stated that “The fact that we [the Republic of
Korea and Japan] are able to create a cooperative policy
network has deep historical meaning ... We hope this
meeting will help the two countries understand each other
better and create an atmosphere where we can overcome
past problems.” See Han (2006).
7 For instance, the Undersecretary for International Af-
fairs of the United States Treasury, Mr. Tim Adams said
in June 2006, “We’re supportive of financial and eco-
nomic integration [in Asia] as long as it’s done in an
open and inclusive manner ... There was a perception
that somehow the U.S. opposed monetary and economic
integration in the region ... That is simply not true. We
are very supportive.” See Schroeder (2006).
8 For a more detailed discussion of the mutual impacts of
efficacy and power, see Finnemore (2005).
9 For the scepticism about the desirability and feasibility
about an Asian Currency Unit appearing in a recent meet-
ing organized by the IMF and the Monetary Authority
of Singapore (MAS), Agence France Presse (2006) and
Tang (2006).
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